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THE GENERAL THEORY OF TAX AVOIDANCE^
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ*
IT used to be said that there were twothings that were unavoidable: death and
taxes. There is a widespread feeling today
that under our present tax code only one
of these is unavoidable. What I wish to
discuss today is why this is so, and how
the extent of tax avoidance would be af-
fected by some of the major tax reforms
presently being discussed.
To do this, I shall first explain a gen-
eral set of principles for tax avoidance,^
(Section I) and then present four methods
of implementing these principles (Section
II). In Section III, I discuss what deter-
mines the limits on the extent to which
individuals can take advantage of tax
avoidance schemes.
Many transactions, while they seem to
reduce the tax liabilities to some parties
to the transaction, increase those of oth-
ers. Because "prices" (the terms of the
transaction) adjust to reflect these changed
tax liabilities, it is often difficult to as-
certain who really benefits from many tax
avoidance schemes. Moreover, the aggre-
gate loss to the Treasury may be much
less than the seeming gain to the alleged
beneficiaries (when those calculations fail
to take account of the general equilib-
rium effects of tax avoidance schemes).
Thus, we follow our partial equilibrium
analysis of tax avoidance (Sections I-III)
with an analysis of some of the more im-
portant general equilibrium effects (Sec-
tion IV). Some implications of our anal-
ysis for tax reform are provided in Section
V.
I. Principles of Tax Avoidance
Tax laws constantly change the oppor-
tunities for tax avoidance, but under-
neath, there remain three basic princi-
ples of tax avoidance within an income
tax:^
(1) Postponement of taxes. The present
discounted value of a postponed tax is
'Princeton University.
much less than that of a tax currently
paid.''
(2) Tax arbitrage across individuals
facing different tax brackets (or the same
individual facing different marginal tax
rates at different times). This is a partic-
ularly effective method of reducing tax li-
abilities within a family; but differential
tax rates may also induce transactions
among individuals in different brackets
which substantially reduce the aggregate
tax liability; the availability of such op-
portunities leads to what may be referred
to as "tax induced transactions."
(3) Tax arbitrage across income streams
facing different tax treatment. Under the
current law, long term capital gains are
taxed at lower rates than are other forms
of income from capital. This provides an
inducement to "convert" the returns to
capital (or to labor) into long-term capital
gains. Similarly, special treatment is af-
forded to the return to capital in the form
of housing, pensions, IRAs, etc.
Many tax avoidance devices involve a
combination of these three. IRA accounts
can be thought of as postponing tax lia-
bilities until retirement; in effect, the in-
terest earned on the IRA account is tax
exempt.^ On the other hand, if the indi-
vidual faces a lower tax rate at retire-
ment than at the time he earns his in-
come, then the IRA can be viewed as tax
arbitrage between different rates.* Fi-
nally, if the individual can borrow to de-
posit funds in the IRA, and interest is tax
deductible, then the IRA is a tax arbi-
trage between two forms of capital, one of
which is not taxed, and the other of which
is (tax deductible).'
Investing in assets yielding capital gains
involves a tax postponement, since taxes
are paid only upon realization. Borrowing
to invest in assets yielding capital gains
involves a tax arbitrage: the interest is
deductible at ordinary rates, the gain is
taxed at favorable capital gains rates.
The tax savings from accelerated de-
preciation with recapture result from
postponement. Without recapture, there
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is the additional gain from the favorahle
treatment of capital gains.
If depreciation allowances corre-
sponded to true economic depreciation, and
capital gains were taxed on an accrual
basis at full rates, then there would be no
tax advantages (or tax induced distor-
tions) from full expensing of maintenance
expenses. If capital gains are taxed only
upon realization, then full expensing of
maintenance expenses (defined as those
expenditures required to maintain the
value of the property) with depreciation
which is rule based (i,e, not directly re-
lated to the change in the value of the
property) has a tax advantage: while the
expenses are currently deductible, the in-
crease in the value (over what it other-
wise would be) is only taxable upon re-
alization; there is a gain from
postponement; if that gain is taxed at fa-
vorable rates, there is a further gain from
arbitraging across rates.
Children's trusts involve tax arbitrage
across units facing different marginal tax
rates,* The trusts are often set up so that
their tax year does not coincide with that
of the child's; this enables a postpone-
ment of the tax liability by almost a year.
The tax advantages that deep dis-
counted bonds previously had arose more
from the tax arbitrage across individuals
facing different rates and from the tax ar-
bitrage from the differences in the treat-
ment of capital gains and interest income
than from the pure postponement effect.
Tax reduction schemes which take ad-
vantage of the differences between ac-
crual and cash accounting are, in effect,
taking advantage of the gains from tax
postponement.
Note that the availability of these dif-
ferent tax reduction-tax avoidance oppor-
tunities depends on different aspects of the
tax system: tax arbitrage across individ-
uals depends on the progressivity of the
tax system, or more accurately, on the fact
that marginal tax rates increase with in-
come.^ Many of the intra-family tax
avoidance schemes entail capital trans-
fers; if capital were not taxed, it would be
much more difficult to engage in these tax
avoidance schemes.
The possibility of postponement is a
concomitant of a tax on a cash basis,'" The
effect of postponement is often to elimi-
nate (part of) the tax on interest income.
Thus, in a flat rate consumption tax, tim-
ing is not of importance.^'
The possibilities of tax arbitrage across
different levels of income arise out of the
attempts to use the tax system to encour-
age particular kinds of activities (risky
ventures, via capital gains; savings for
retirement, via pensions and IRAs),
II. Some Basic Methods of Tax
Avoidance
So potent are the opportunities for tax
avoidance within our current tax struc-
ture that, under the hypothesis that cap-
ital markets are perfect (zero transac-
tions costs, no restrictions on borrowing
or short sales, for every security there is
a linear combination of other securities
which yields an identical return), individ-
uals could risklessly eliminate all taxes
on capital, and indeed, with a little ad-
ditional effort, they may be able to elim-
inate their tax liabilities altogether. There
is not just one way, but a multiplicity of
ways by which taxes can be avoided. Let
me briefly describe four modifications of
what are, in fact, familiar tax avoidance
schemes. The modifications/\arise be-
cause, under my assumptions of a perfect
capital market, I need not concern myself
about transactions costs; I assume that
individuals can borrow against collater-
alizable assets; if the probability of de-
fault is zero, they pay the safe interest
rate; if not, they will have to pay a higher
interest rate, but the interest rate will de-
pend simply on the collateral available to
cover the debt in the event of a default.
We also assume that all securities can be
sold short, and that there are no trans-
actions costs involved in doing so.'^
Consider first how an individual would
have allocated his portfolio over his life in
the absence of taxes, (For our purposes, it
makes no difference whether the individ-
ual has chosen his portfolio to maximize
his lifetime expected utility or not,) We
construct tax avoidance strategies which
leave the individual's consumption and
bequests in each state of nature and at
each date unchanged (and correspond-
ingly, raise no revenue); the individual
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faces no more (or less) risk than he faced
in the original situation. The tax has no
real effects on the economy. For simplic-
ity, we assume a given marginal tax rate;
thus none of the procedures we describe
are based on taking advantage of the op-
portunities for tax avoidance afforded by
different individuals facing different tax
rates.
Method 1, Postponement of capital
gains. The first method is a modification
of the familiar technique of postponing the
realization of capital gains, which gives
rise to the locked-in effect. It is based on
two aspects of the tax code: capital gains
are taxed only upon realization, and there
is a step up in basis at death. The usual
discussions err, however, in not taking into
account the fact that the riskiness of an
individual's portfolio (and his consump-
tion stream) will change if an individual
holds on to an asset longer than he oth-
erwise would simply to avoid taxes. To
avoid taxes and any change in the pat-
tern of risk bearing or consumption, the
individual sells short a perfectly corre-
lated security (or a set of securities, the
returns to which are perfectly correlated
with his original securities), at precisely
the same moment that he would have, in
the absence of taxation, sold the given se-
curity. The individual's (net) portfolio po-
sitions and income flows are then iden-
tical to what they would have otherwise
been; but because no capital gain has been
realized, no capital gain tax liability has
been incurred. It is thus apparent how an
individual can risklessly avoid paying
capital gains taxes.
But he can do still better for himself.
Assume that at any date, the individual
buys a security and sells a perfectly cor-
related (set of) security (securities) short.
Again, the individual's net portfolio po-
sition is unchanged. At the end of the year,
one asset will have increased in value, the
other decreased; the individual sells the
latter, using the loss to offset other in-
come. At the same time, the individual
finds some other security (or linear com-
bination of securities) which is perfectly
(positively or negatively) correlated, and
takes an offsetting position in that secu-
rity. Thus, again, the individual has been
able to avoid all risk (since throughout.
his net position in the set of perfectly cor-
related securities remains zero). But now
he has succeeded in obtaining losses, which
he can use to offset against other in-
When the individual dies, his heirs close
out his positions; with the step up in ba-
sis, no tax liabilities become due.
Two objections to this method that are
commonly raised are that it ignores the
consequences of limitations on loss offsets
and wash sales. These are important
questions, to which I shall return later.
Method 2, Arbitraging between short-
term and long-term capital gains rates.
The previous method of tax avoidance took
advantage of the fact that capital gains
are only taxed upon realization; it did not
take advantage of the lower rates which
are afforded capital gains. The second
method does. But while optimal portfolio
strategies in the previous method exhib-
ited the "locked-in effect," with this method
they do not.
Individuals again purchase and sell
short two perfectly correlated securities,
so that the net position in the two assets
together remains zero; no risk has been
incurred,^'' Just before the end of the
minimum holding period required for el-
igibility for long term treatment, the in-
dividual will have made a capital gain on
one, a capital loss on the other; he real-
izes the capital loss, then the next mo-
ment (when the security becomes eligible
for long term treatment) he realizes the
capital gain. If the change in price is p(t
-I- 1) - p(t), and long term capital gains
are taxed at 40 percent of full rates (T),
then this tax arbitrage generates a tax
saving of
.6T[p(t + 1) - p(t)]
The major objection to this method is that
it ignores the special provisions by which
long-term gains are used to offset short-
term losses. This objection can be over-
come, if there are methods by which or-
dinary income (losses) can be converted
into (short-term) capital gains.'^ There are
several methods by which his can be done.
For instance, in the options market, some
of the capital gains that one attains may
be an implicit interest return; that is, one
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can (in principle, in the absence of trans-
actions costs) engage in a set of transac-
tions which involves borrowing and buy-
ing options, which is perfectly riskless, but
which generates an interest deduction and
a short-term capital gain. One can do this
to the point that not only are all capital
gains offset, but all capital income, and a
limited amount of wage income (the lim-
itation of interest deductibility plus the
limitation on loss offsets).
Method 3, Indebtedness. The third
method takes advantage of the differen-
tial treatment afforded long-term capital
gains and interest. From an economic point
of view, interest and capital gains are
simply two alternative forms of return on
capital; there would be no reason to dif-
ferentiate among them, (Indeed, what ap-
pears to be a capital gain depends on the
choice of a numeraire; though money
seems, for many purposes, a natural nu-
meraire, it has increasingly been recog-
nized that for purposes of taxation "con-
sumption" provides a better numeraire;^®
this is what has given rise to the strong
support for indexing the tax system.) As-
sume that there were no uncertainty about
changes in the price of gold. An exhaust-
ible natural resource like gold should have
its price rise at the rate of interest. All of
the returns, however, are realized in the
form of capital gains. If an individual
borrows to purchase gold, then his inter-
est would be deductible against ordinary
income, his capital gains taxed at favor-
able rates. With a perfect capital market,
there would be no reason that the bank
would not lend to the individual: he could
simply put up the gold as collateral, and
there would thus be no risk to either party.
Actually, to take advantage of this
method, long-term capital gains need not
even be taxed at lower rates: the individ-
ual would gain simply from the postpone-
ment effect. And if there is a step up of
basis upon death, then the gains from this
method are all the greater.
To implement this method, there need
not exist a perfectly safe asset; all that is
required is that there exists an asset (or
a linear combination of assets) which yield
a strictly positive return in all states of
nature, and that one can issue an option
to divest oneself of all the risk associated
with returns in excess of the minimum
return.
In some sense, this method can be
viewed as a special case of Method
1. borrowing is nothing more than sell-
ing short a safe bond.
Method 4, Rollovers. This method takes
advantage of the arbitrariness of the unit
of time over which taxes are levied. It does
not, however, require that there be dif-
ferential tax rates on long-term and short-
term capital gains. As in Methods 1 and
2, the individual purchases a security and
sells short a perfectly correlated security
(linear combination of securities), so that
he incurs no risk. But now, on December
31, on one part of his position he will have
a capital gain, on the other part a capital
loss. He realizes his loss; on January 1, he
realizes his gain. The next year, of course,
he must engage in similar transactions to
a greater extent, not only to wipe out other
forms of capital income, but also to elim-
inate the January 1 capital gain. Though
the 1981 Act eliminated some of the easy
opportunities for these tax arbitrage ac-
tivities, it by no means closed all of them.
This list of tax avoidance procedures is
not meant to be exhaustive. The incen-
tives for engaging in these activities are
sufficiently great that even fairly large
transaction costs should not have de-
terred them. For most of the methods, no
capital is required: the individual simply
engages in two offsetting actions. Where
loans are required, the banks should be
willing to provide them, since there are
always offsetting assets; indeed, as we
have emphasized, these activities are
really tax arbitrage activities: the indi-
vidual needs to undertake no additional
risk, so the terms at which banks should
be willing to lend to the individual should
be the same as they were willing to lend
in the absence of taxation.
III. Limits to Tax Avoidance
I am not an empirical economist; but
there are certain conclusions that one can
make about the so called real world with-
out a detailed econometric study. One such
conclusion is that individuals do pay taxes,
and that indeed, many individuals seem
to be paying taxes on their capital in-
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come. There are four possible conclusions
one can reach from this empirical obser-
vation:
(a) I erred in proving my theorems: the
conclusions do not follow from the as-
sumptions.
(b) I erred in failing to take into ac-
count certain detailed provisions of the tax
code.
(c) I erred in assuming a perfect capi-
tal market.
(d) I erred in ascribing more astute-
ness (understanding of the tax code and
the economy) to the taxpayer than he has.
In a talk like this, you will simply have
to take my word that the error does not
lie in (a).'^
In my analysis of the tax code, I have
kept to the standard textbook formula-
tion. To criticize (b) then is to suggest that
the effects of the tax system depend crit-
ically on provisions which these treat-
ments have ignored. Among the special
provisions, for instance, are those which
restrict wash sales, the limitations on the
deductibility of losses, and the limita-
tions on the deductibility of interest.
If, however, capital markets were per-
fect, then these provisions would not be
very restrictive. Consider, for instance, the
restrictions on wash sales, the purpose of
which is to ensure that an individual does
not sell and then buy back the security,
the only purpose of the transaction being
to gain some tax advantage. In a perfect
capital market, however, no security is
unique: there are many securities (or lin-
ear combinations of securities) which yield
the identical pattern of returns. Thus, to
maintain a riskless position, the individ-
ual does not have to buy and sell the same
security. Since what is relevant is the in-
dividual's subjective judgements concern-
ing the patterns of returns, ascertaining
whether the individual has engaged in a
riskless arbitrage is a virtual impossibil-
ity; and the administrative burdens of at-
tempting to do so, even if subjective prob-
abilities could be ascertained from previous
returns, would provide a nightmare of the
courts, though possibly a boon to litiga-
tion-minded econometricians.
Part of the problem undoubtedly lies in
the third assumption: that of a perfect
capital market.'* As an aside, I find it re-
markable how almost a whole sub-disci-
pline has developed, analyzing the behav-
ior of financial markets, attempting to test
with sophisticated econometric tech-
niques whether capital markets work
perfectly and whether individuals "ra-
tionally" allocate their portfolios, which
at the same time ignores tax considera-
tions. Ignoring taxes is not ignoring
something which should be viewed as
leading to a third order refinement of the
theory: with wealthy individuals in re-
cent history facing nominal tax rates of
50 percent, 70 percent, or more, the tax
effects are first order effects, and any test
of any attribute of financial markets which
ignores them needs, at best, to be treated
with skepticism. Indeed, there is avail-
able a simple test of the perfect capital
model: do individuals pay taxes, or pay
taxes on their capital income?
Moreover, the fact that individuals do
not even take full advantage of the lim-
itations on interest deductibility provides
further evidence that the perfect capital
market/astute investor model is inappro-
priate.'^ Whether this is because of cap-
ital market imperfections, or because of
lack of astuteness on the part of taxpay-
ers, is difficult to ascertain.^" Probably
both play an important role. In either case,
however, the consequences of tax changes
may be markedly different from those that
would be predicted by the conventional
economist's model assuming perfect capi-
tal markets and "rational" tax avoiding
firms and consumers.^' As an example,
with imperfect capital markets, an in-
crease in the corporate tax rate might have
a deleterious effect on firms' investment
because of a reduction in the internal
funds available for investment; a perfect
market marginal analysis might suggest
(with true economic depreciation, and in-
terest deductibility) no effect on invest-
ments, since returns and costs of capital
are reduced proportionally. (See Stiglitz
[1973, 1976].)
IV. Tax Avoidance and General
Equilibrium Analysis
One of the important lessons to emerge
from the analysis of taxes during the past
decade is that one cannot analyze the ef-
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fects of a single tax in isolation from other
taxes; for instance, the effects of the cor-
porate income tax depend on the struc-
ture of the individual income tax (includ-
ing its provisions for the taxation of capital
gains [Stiglitz, 1973]),
Similarly, the effects of a tax structure
cannot be analyzed by looking at its ef-
fects on a single individual This is par-
ticularly true of the analysis of tax avoid-
ance. Transactions which reduce one
individual's tax liability may increase the
tax liability of others. The terms of the
transaction will reflect this. Thus, look-
ing at the first individual's tax savings
may give a wrong impression both con-
cerning the total cost to the government
of the tax avoidance activity and the in-
cidence of the benefits from tax avoid-
ance.
This general principle has been recog-
nized for a long time. If all individuals
faced the same marginal tax bracket, then
exempting state and local bond interest
would simply reduce the rate of return on
these bonds to the point where it equalled
the after-tax return of taxed bonds (of
equal risk). The individual would be no
better off than he would have been if he
had not bought the tax exempt bonds. The
benefits all accrue to the communities is-
suing
How does this general equilibrium per-
spective alter our analysis of the previous
section? Two questions need to be posed.
Consistency of tax avoidance activities.
First, if all individuals attempted to pur-
sue the policies indicated, would they be
able to avoid taxes?
At first blush, the answer seems to be
no: assume two individuals A and B were
pursuing tax avoidance method #2, As-
sume securities x and y are perfectly cor-
related. Individual A buys a share of x and
sells short a share of y; individual B buys
a share of y and sells short a share of x.
Their actions are offsetting: the net de-
mand for shares in x and y are unaf-
fected. At the end of six months assume
the price of x (and y) has in fact de-
creased. Thus A sells x, and B sells y: their
actions are not offsetting. It appears as if
markets do not clear. But this ignores the
fact that both A and B will want to cover
their exposed position for the moment from
just before six months to just after six
months: A will wish to buy y and B will
wish to buy x; hence the net demand re-
mains zero,
A similar analysis applies for the roll-
over method. Now, on December 31, A sells
X and buys y, while B sells y and buys x.
These methods work even if the "asset"
purchased is a contract on the futures
market. In such markets, whenever one
individual takes a position, another in-
dividual takes the opposite position. Thus,
if A sells B a contract for future delivery
of wheat at a fixed price, when the price
of wheat goes up, A is worse off, B is bet-
ter off. Assume A sells B a contract for
wheat, and B sells A a contract for a per-
fectly correlated commodity, which we
shall refer to as Commodity Z. The posi-
tions are offsetting so neither individual
is bearing any risk! Assume just before the
end of six months the price of wheat has
risen. A sells his contract for delivery of
wheat to C, realizing a short-term capital
loss; at the same time he buys from C a
contract for delivery of commodity Z; sim-
ilarly C buys from B a contract for the de-
livery of Z, and sells a contract for the de-
livery of wheat. At the end. A, B, and C
remain perfectly hedged. Then, just after
six months has passed, all positions are
closed out: A realizes a long-term gain on
his commodity Z contract, B a long-term
gain on his wheat contract, and C realizes
small, offsetting gains and losses.
Note that this tax arbitrage possibility
was not eliminated by provisions for con-
structive realization on December 31.
These were aimed at our fourth method
of tax avoidance, recording losses in one
year and gains the next.
Note that tax avoidance schemes based
on borrowing would not be effective in an
economy in which all individuals faced the
same marginal tax rate: any tax savings
from an interest deduction by one indi-
vidual would give rise to an offsetting tax
liability by another.
Though the general equilibrium per-
spective alters one's views concerning the
tax savings which can be achieved by
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purely financial arbitrage activities, at
least in a world in which all individuals
face the same tax rate, the basic tax
avoidance principles we described earlier
can be used to reduce, and possibly elim-
inate, taxes on the return to real capital
assets. Thus, the present discounted value
of tax liabilities are reduced as a result
of postponing the realization of gains and
taking losses as soon as possible^^ and they
are reduced by holding on to assets which
have increased in value at least to the time
at which they are eligible for long-term
treatment.
The Relative Importance of Different
Tax Avoidatice Devices
We have thus shown that some of the
tax avoidance strategies described earlier
are effective, even in a world in which all
individuals faced the same tax rate, and
even when the tax counsequences for all
individuals were appropriately taken into
account. But the aggregate tax savings
associated with various transactions may
be far different from what appear^* to be
the tax savings to one individual. As a re-
sult, the relative importance of different
tax avoidance schemes may look quite
different from a general equilibrium^^
perspective than from a partial equilib-
rium perspective. In particular, many of
the tax savings which appear as arising
from postponement are really tax savings
which arise from arbitraging across rates.
We have noted one example earlier: the
real tax savings (at least in a perfect cap-
ital market) from IRA accounts arise not
from the postponement of taxes, but from
arbitraging between the tax deductibility
of interest and the non-taxability of in-
terest accruing in IRA accounts.^ ®
Installment purchases. As another ex-
ample consider the tax consequences of a
delay in the "official" transfer of the own-
ership of an asset (for tax purposes). It
appears as if there has been a gain from
postponement. Assume the two individu-
als involved in the transaction are in the
same tax bracket; A is selling the asset to
B. Assume, moreover, that A wishes to
receive the cash today. If the sale was
completed today, A would incur a tax li-
ability of, say, tg, where g was the capital
gain on the asset. Assume, instead, that
B lends him the money at a zero interest
rate^^; A effectively turns over control of
the asset, but the sale is not officially
completed until the next period. Then the
only implications for either party is that
the present discounted value of the tax li-
ability on the capital gains has been re-
duced. Since capital gains taxes are paid
only upon realization, there is a general
equilibrium tax savings from postponing
realization.
But if A and B are in different tax
brackets, the tax savings may be far
larger: If the gain is "recognized" today,
A has, after tax, (1 + g - gtA), where 1
is his basis; and if he invests this, at the
after tax return of r'A, he will have (1 +
g ~ gtA)(l + T'A). On the other hand, if
the trade is not "consummated" until next
period, B will have (1 -H g) (1 + r's). As-
sume B turns this over to A. A will then
have, after tax,
(1 + g)(l + r'B)(l - tA) + tA,
a gain of
(r's - r'A)(l + g (1 - tA)) + tAr'e;
the first term represents the gain from tax
arbitrage across individuals; the second
terms represents the gain from postpone-
ment. As the limiting case, assume B has
a zero marginal tax bracket, and A is in
the 50 percent tax bracket, with capital
gains taxed at 20 percent. Then the tax
savings is .5r(l + .8g) + .2r; the tax sav-
ings are largely due to arbitraging across
individuals.
Early recognition of gains. In the ex-
ample we have just described, we have
shown how it inay pay to delay the "of-
ficial" transfer by ownership (and thus the
recognition of a capital gain). But this is
not always the case. With depreciable as-
sets, there is a step up in basis upon the
transfer of ownership, and the tax advan-
tages of this may well outweigh the dis-
advantages of paying the capital gains tax.
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Take, as an example, a machine which
will last for one more year. It was ex-
pected to produce an output of $1; at a 10
percent discount rate, its current value is
approximately $.9. Assume now that the
(net) output that it is expected to produce
doubled; this would imply that its market
price would double; the owner would have
a $.9 capital gain. But note that we will
tax the extra income as it accrues. To tax
the capital gain, representing the expec-
tation of future income and to tax the ex-
tra future income seems to be taxing the
same extra income twice, and this seems
unfair. But, if we have true economic de-
preciation, there is not any real "double"
taxation; the new owner will have higher
depreciation allowances reflecting the
higher capital value. With true economic
depreciation, full taxation of (accrued)
capital gains would be required in this
situation to avoid distortions within an
income tax. With a flat rate tax, the dif-
ference between doing this, and simply
taxing the income as it accrued is the tax
on the (implicit) interest income. In our
example there will be a capital gain of 1/
1 + r = .9, in the absence of taxation; with
taxation, but true economic depreciation,
the present discounted value of this in-
crease is unchanged.^* Hence, the in-
crease in tax liabilities is t /[l + r] this
period; next period net income is 1 - de-
preciation = 1 - 1/[1 + r] = r/[ l + r]
and the tax next period is thus tr /[ l + r].
The present discounted value of tax pay-
ments, using the discount rate, r*, is just
t[(l/l 4- r) + (r/(l + r)(l -h r*)] = t[l +(r/
1 + r*)]/l + r.
If there had been no tax on capital gain,
but no concurrent increase in the depre-
ciation allowance, the increase in tax li-
ability (as a result of the increased pro-
ductivity of the asset), next period is just
t. Thus, the difference in the present dis-
counted value of tax liabilities is just t /
(1 + r) + [t/(l + r)][l - (1/(1 + r)] - t /
(1 + r*) = tr /( l + r) ' -t- t(r* - r)/(l +
r*)(l + r).
On the other hand, if the asset were sold,
by individual A to individual B, with true
economic depreciation, the total present
discounted value of the difference in tax
liabilities (between what it would have
been without the realization of the capi-
tal gain and the corresponding step up in
basis and with it) is^^
tA/1 + r -f (te/l + ri)[l - (1/1 + r)]
- tA/1 + rS = [tA(r* - r)(l + rg) + tsr
rg).
Thus, with a flat rate tax, with r = r*,
with full taxation of capital gains, and
with true economic depreciation, it would
always pay to postpone the realization of
the gain. But if r*A = (1 - tA)r, then early
realization may be desirable. All of this
changes dramatically, however, when
there is not true economic depreciation and
when capital gains are taxed at favorable
rates. Consider first the consequences of
taxing capital gains at favorable rates, say
.4 of ordinary rates. Then the net change
in aggregate tax liabilities from the
transfer is .4tA/l + r + (tg/l + r*B)[l -
1/1 + r] - tA/1 + r*A = [-tAZ + r te/ l +
r]/l + r*B, z = (1 -H rg)/(l -f rj) - .4(1
+ rg)/(l + r) = .6 if rg = r j = r. Thus,
for short lived assets (low r) or highly taxed
individuals (high tA), it pays to realize the
capital gain early.^"'^'
The tax consequences of recognizing a
capital gain are somewhat different if
there is accelerated depreciation. Con-
sider a two period asset, whose return at
each date unexpectedly increases by a
dollar. With straight line depreciation the
increment in value is given by the solu-
tion to
V = (1 - ts) 8 + tB8V/2
where
8 = 1 / 1 + r*B + 1/(1 + r*B)'
Hence
V = (1 - tB)8/[l - tB8/2]
Hence the change in tax liability from
transferring ownership is (using B's dis-
count rate)
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(.4tA - .58tB)V + (tB - tA)5.
The accelerated depreciation presumably
increases the value of an asset. Notice,
however, that with a flat rate tax, with
no favorable treatment of capital gains,
the magnitude of the tax change from
transferring ownership is relatively small.
Thus, with a flat rate tax, the distortions
associated with the failure to tax capital
gains on depreciable assets upon accrual
may be relatively small.
Our general equilibrium analysis of the
tax consequences of the realization of
capital gains has thus uncovered a fun-
damental error in the standard partial
equilibrium treatment. The gains from the
step-up in basis have to be contrasted with
the losses from the early recognition of a
gain: though with true economic depre-
ciation and full taxation of capital gains,
it remains true that early recognition is
undesirable, with favorable treatment of
capital gains and with depreciation that
is faster than true economic depreciation,
early recognition may well be desirable;
the gains become particularly significant,
however, when individuals are in mark-
edly different tax brackets.
Ownership of "capital gain assets."
Similarly, the tax structure potentially has
important implications for the pattern of
ownership of assets. Assume, for in-
stance, that A owns an asset which nat-
urally yields its return in the form of cap-
ital gains (like gold). Assume that the real
rate of capital gain is g. If A lends B the
money to buy the asset, charging an in-
terest rate equal to r*, where
r*(l - tA) = g(l - .4tA)
then A is indifferent: A has received the
same after tax return. But B's net income
is
1 + g(l - .4tB) - (1 + r*(l - tB))
= g[(l - .4tB) - (1 - to)
(1 - .4tA)/(l - tA)]
= .6g(tB - tA)/l - tA > 0,
if B faces a higher tax rate than A. This
suggests that all of the capital gain yield-
ing assets should be owned by individuals
in the high tax brackets. (High tax bracket
individuals should engage in this kind of
arbitrage until either there are no more
such opportunities (and additional oppor-
tunities cannot easily be created) or until
tax brackets are equalized.)
These calculations suggest that much
of the gain from tax avoidance activities
under our present tax structure arise from
arbitraging across rates, rather than from
postponement. Indeed, there is some
question about the significance to be at-
tached to the postponement effect. Real
rates of interest on government securities'^
have, from 1950 to 1984, averaged less
than .75 percent. Thus the loss to the gov-
ernment from a tax which is postponed for
five or ten or even twenty years is rela-
tively small. Individuals' gains may be
much higher: they face higher real inter-
est rates.^' Because of limitations on col-
lateralizable assets, the government may
be in a better position to serve as a "lender"
(through the tax system) than are private
lenders.
(With a progressive tax system, the
government may not be in an advanta-
geous position relative to a private lender.
While limited liability limits in general,
what a private lender can get back, a pri-
vate lender can require the owner of a firm
to sign a personal note guaranteeing part
or all of a loan. The government cannot,
and individuals thus can design contracts
under which losses accrue to those in high
marginal tax rates, gains to those in low
marginal tax rates, in effect yielding the
government a negative return on its loan.)
To the extent that the government can
devise tax systems which allow individ-
uals discretion in the timing of their tax
liabilities, the government may be im-
proving the efficiency of the capital mar-
ket and this in turn will have a beneficial
effect on the economy. But though there
may be some beneficial effects associated
with "postponement" many of the tax
avoidance activities have a deleterious ef-
fect.
Real resource allocation effects. Most of
this paper has focused on how paper
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transactions can, without cost to soci-
ety,^ * enahle the reduction in tax liabili-
ties. In the presence of a perfect capital
market, presumably all tax liahilities could
he eliminated. But we do not have a "per-
fect" capital market, and all tax liabili-
ties are not, therefore, eliminated simply
hy means of "paper" transactions. To re-
duce tax liahilities distorting actions are
resorted to. Some of these are closely
linked to the very reason that capital
markets are not perfect.
Elsewhere, I have argued why imper-
fections (and, in particular, asymmetries)
of information result in the capital mar-
ket being fundamentally different from
how it is envisaged in the traditional neo-
classical paradigm.^ ® In that model, own-
ership makes no difference: the manager
simply maximizes the market value of the
firm. But with imperfect information (or
incomplete markets), ownership is of im-
portance. And ownership entails having
the claim on residual income (and having
other residual rights not specified in a
contractual arrangement). Thus, in our
earlier discussion, we noted that there was
an incentive to delay the recognition of a
capital gain, by delaying the completion
of a transaction, i.e. delaying the turning
over of all residual claims with respect to
income and other rights.
Similarly, we noted there was an in-
centive to have higher income individuals
receiving income in the form of capital
gains, lower income individuals in the form
of interest; while the latter are usually
associated with debt, the former are as-
sociated with "ownership"^^; thus, our tax
system encourages the perpetuation of
control of productive assets hy the wealthy.
These are, by no means, the only real
distortions associated with our tax sys-
tem: since there are some sectors where
it seems easier to convert ordinary in-
come into capital gains (real estate, in
particular), investments in these sectors
are encouraged, since they increase the
opportunities for tax avoidance.
V. Tax Reform
This analysis of tax avoidance behavior
has some striking implications for tax re-
form. Many of the tax avoidance schemes
lose their force (within a general equilib-
rium context) with a flat rate tax (or with
greatly reduced differences in marginal
tax rates).
With a flat rate income tax, for in-
stance, all interest received could be made
tax deductible (with interest payments not
tax deductible). In a closed economy, the
only net interest payments would be from
the government. Given the current tax
deductibility of state and local interest
payments, the only effect would be to de-
crease the interest rate the federal gov-
ernment would have to pay (it would be
as if the government collected the tax on
its interest payments at source).^' (In an
open economy, the effect of making inter-
est income non-taxable would depend on
the treatment of payments to and from
foreign sources.)
Similarly, as we have noted, some of the
central problems of capital gains taxation
are reduced with a flat rate tax.
We have emphasized so far the impor-
tant role that differences in marginal tax
rates play in tax avoidance under the in-
come tax. Similar problems might well
arise in the consumption tax. Consider,
for instance, the Blueprints proposal to
have registered and unregistered assets.
Assume A is in a higher tax bracket than
B. Assume A and B swap registered for
unregistered assets, so that it appears as
if A's consumption has decreased and B's
consumption has increased. Then current
tax liabilities would have reduced (for A
and B together) by tA - ts. To avoid risk,
A and B sign contracts promising to swap
back again next year. It will then appear
as if A's consumption has, at that date in-
creased, and B's consumption has de-
creased. Whether the present discounted
value of tax liabilities will have increased
or decreased (in the aggregate) as a result
of this tax swap depends on the relative
valuation of the assets at the two dates.
If the values increase by the market rate
of interest, there will be no change in the
present discounted value of aggregate tax
liabilities. But if the values increase less
than the rate of interest, then such a swap
reduces the aggregate tax liabilities, and
if the values increase by more than the
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rate of interest, then the reverse swap
would reduce the aggregate tax liabili-
ties. One of the main arguments in favor
of the consumption tax, that it would avoid
the difficult and arbitrary valuation
problems which are pervasive under the
income tax, seems less persuasive in the
context of a consumption tax which does
not have a flat rate. And such tax avoid-
ance activities may have quite similar
distortionary effects to the kinds of tax
avoidance activities currently observed
under the income tax.
Conclusions
We have outlined in this paper a gen-
eral set of principles for tax avoidance;
most of at least the common tax avoid-
ance schemes can be reinterpreted as
making use of one or more of these prin-
ciples.
In a perfect capital market, these prin-
ciples of tax avoidance are so powerful as
to enable the astute taxpayer to eliminate
all taxation on capital income, and pos-
sibly all taxation on wage income as well.
The fact that the tax system raises reve-
nue is thus a tribute to the lack of as-
tuteness of the taxpayer and/or the lack
of perfection of the capital market.
This in turn has an important impli-
cation: one should treat with some skep-
ticism models which attempt to analyze
the effects of taxation assuming rational,
maximizing taxpayers working within a
perfect capital market.
Some (perhaps most) of the imperfec-
tions of the capital market are attribut-
able to imperfections (including asym-
metries) of information. In economies with
imperfect information ownership/control
is important; many of the tax avoidance
devices necessitate altering patterns of
ownership, and this may have important
implications for real resource allocation.
A full analysis of tax avoidance cannot
be conducted within a partial equilibrium
model; when one individual reduces a tax
liability through some transaction, that
transaction may at the same time in-
crease the tax liability incurred by an-
other. In that case, the terms at which the
transaction are conducted will reflect this
"shifting" of tax liabilities. If the two in-
dividuals are in the same tax bracket, no
real tax avoidance may have occurred.
Such is the case when an individual bor-
rows from another; while the interest is
deductible by one, it is taxable to the other.
We have delineated those tax avoidance
schemes which do indeed reduces the ag-
gregate tax liabilities of all those who
participate in them.
We have noted, in particular, that much
of the "general equilibrium" gain from tax
avoidance arises from differences in tax
rates, both across individuals and across
classes of income (rather than from "post-
ponement"). If this is true, then reforms
aimed at reducing the differences in mar-
ginal tax rates may be effective in reduc-
ing tax avoidance; there may be signifi-
cant gains to be had from going to a flat
rate tax, whether of the income or con-
sumption variety.
FOOTNOTES
'Financial support from the National Science Foun-
dation is gratefully acknowledged.
I^ focus on the individual income tax, and do not
discuss the role of the corporation tax in tax avoid-
ance, or the methods by which corporate tax liabili-
ties may be reduced.
In terms of the Cordes-Galper classification of tax
shelters, the tax avoidance schemes on which I focus
are pure arbitrage schemes ("pure tax shelters") as
opposed to "tax-preferred activities" such as gas and
oil.
In my analysis, I do not discuss, moreover, the eco-
nomic, political, or social arguments behind those
provisions of the tax code which give rise to tax
avoidance opportunities. My concern is rather to de-
scribe the consequences of these provisions. To the ex-
tent that these tax avoidance activities run counter
to the intent of these provisions, these consequences
clearly have to be borne in mind in evaluating their
desirability.
'A fuller discussion of these tax avoidance princi-
ples is contained in Stiglitz, [19861 Chapter 24, "A
Student's Guide to Tax Avoidance".
^Unless, of course, the tax liability is increased as
a result of postponement. We shall note instances of
this below.
*rhat is, if the individual's marginal tax rate at the
date he earned the income and at retirement were the
same, T, then, if he paid the tax at the time he earned
the income, but if interest income were tax exempt,
he would have at retirement, T years later, (1 - rje'",
whereas if he used an IRA account, at retirement he
would have, before taxes e'", and after taxes he would
have had (1 - T)e"'^ , precisely the same amount.
^Though the term "tax avoidance" suggests that in-
dividuals are not paying taxes that they "should" this
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is not necessarily the case: even apart from the al-
leged beneficial incentive arguments often raised in
behalf of special tax provisions by their advocates,
there may be equity arguments as well. For instance,
lifetime income seems a more equitable tax base than
annual income; but provisions for income averaging
are inadequate. Hence, "arbitrage" by individuals
across different marginal tax rates they face at dif-
ferent times of their lives increases the equity of the
tax system.
'For a fuller discussion of the incentive and equity
effects of IRAs, see Stiglitz, [1986], Chapters 22 and
23.
^Though the maximum tax savings from this kind
of tax arbitrage is limited. If a wealthy, married cou-
ple with four children set up eight trusts, their max-
imum total tax savings in 1983 was $90,700. The
minimum income required to achieve this is $745,400.
Somebody with this income has his average tax rate
reduced from 47.9% to 35.7%.
'A flat rate tax with an exemption is progressive,
in the sense that the average tax rate increases with
income.
'"Though under accrual, there are often opportun-
ities for postponement, taking advantage of particu-
lar rules which define when income or expenses are
accrued.
"Later, we shall show that, at least for some ver-
sions of a progressive consumption tax, there may still
be tax avoidance possibilities.
""We ignore all the institutional details associated
with short sales. If a security costs p and yields a
stream of returns of x(e,t), in state 6 at date t, then
if an individual sells the security short, he receives
p, and must pay out -x{e,t) in state 9 at date t.
"Note that in our perfect capital market world, the
individual needs no capital to engage in these trans-
actions.
"Again, the individual could buy two perfectly neg-
atively correlated securities; or he could identify two
perfectly correlated sets of securities, buying one and
selling the other short.
'^Note that the objective in converting ordinary in-
come losses into short term capital gains is not to gain
a direct tax savings—the two are taxed at the same
rate; but rather to overcome other limitations within
the tax code which might restrict the ability to take
advantage of the favorable treatment of long-term
capital gains.
'^Elsewhere, I have argued that the main distortion
to our economy from inflation arises from the failure
to appropriately index the tax system. See Stiglitz
[1981].
"For sketches of proofs, see Stiglitz [1983].
"The term "imperfect capital markets" is used to
cover a whole host of sins. The imperfections with
which we are concerned here need not reflect "irra-
tionalities" of the market. Rather, they may be the
consequence of real costs of transactions and imper-
fect and costly information. Simple transactions costs
(i.e., those not associated with imperfect information)
probably cannot account for the failure of individuals
to take full advantage of the available tax avoidance
schemes. Imperfect information can account both for
credit rationing and the high costs of raising funds
by issuing new equity. See Stiglitz and Weiss [1981,
1983], and Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss [1984].
''See Feenberg [1981].
^"There are many other instances in which tax-
payer behavior seems inconsistent with perfect mar-
kets with perfectly rational individuals. These in-
clude the "dividend paradox" [Stiglitz, 1973], the
"inventory valuation paradox," and the "managerial
compensation paradox." In each case, the behavior can
be "explained" by rational managers dealing with ir-
rational shareholders or by non-maximizing (non-as-
tute) managers. See Stiglitz [1982b, 1985a, 1985b].
^'Similarly, optimal portfolio behavior with taxes
and imperfect capital markets is markedly different
from what it would be without taxes and perfect cap-
ital markets. See Stiglitz [1983].
^^ Of course, if no restrictions are imposed on com-
munities issuing these bonds, they could engage in
tax arbitrage, raising funds by issuing tax exempt
bonds and then lending out the money.
^In particular, even if there were not favorable
treatment of long term capital gains, losses should be
recognized in the year in which they occur. Assume
there are two perfectly correlated assets, x and y, which
have decreased in price. If A owns x and B owns y,
they can achieve a tax savings by swapping on De-
cember 31; this leaves unaltered their risk position.
'"The actual tax savings to the individual may also
be quite different from what they appear to be be-
cause the terms of the transaction may be markedly
different from what they would have been in the ab-
sence of taxation.
^It should be emphasized that our general equilib-
rium analysis is still not completely general: we ig-
nore effects on prices and before-tax interest rates.
These are crucial for assessing the incidence of tax
avoidance schemes such a real estate, and gas and oil
investments, as opposed to the pure tax arbitrage
schemes. See Stiglitz [1986].
'°It obviously makes no difference whether individ-
uals are restricted from borrowing to deposit funds in
IRA accovmts. Individuals simply borrow more for other
reasons, leaving them more money available for de-
positing in their IRA accounts. The only real effects
arise if IRA accounts are not collateralizable.
"The interest rate charged makes no difference to
aggregate tax liabilities, since the tax liability of B
is offset by the tax deduction of A.
^ h e incremental value, with true economic depre-
ciation, is
V = (1 - t)/[l + r - rt - t]
V = (1 - t)/[(l + r)(l - t)]
= 1/1 + r
^ h i s calculation discounts each individual's tax li-
abilities at his own discount rate.
^Remember these calculations have nothing to do
with the transfer of "money," only with the transfer
of ownership claims in the asset.
"The critical condition for the desirability of own-
ership transfer is
.6tA s rtfl/l + r.
Thus, if tA = ts, asset transfer is desirable if r s 1.5.
^^hree month Treasury bill rates minus the rate
of inflation.
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^'Presumably, reflecting the greater risk to lending
to them. They may also face credit rationing. See
Stiglitz and Weiss [1981].
Other than the direct transactions costs.
^'See, for instance, Stiglitz [1982a and 1985a].
'*rhere are some subtle and difficult questions as-
sociated with why this is so, and whether it must nec-
essarily be so.
"With a flat rate tax, interest rates on state and
local bonds would presumably fully reflect the tax ex-
empt status; the only inefficiency associated with the
tax deductibility of state and local interest is the in-
centive that it would provide for excessive capital ex-
penditures.
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